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I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United States and Israel is a
complicated one and has historically been defined by major
geopolitical issues such as the Cold War and the ongoing Middle
East peace process. Thus, it can be considered something of a
surprise that the most volatile political rift between the United
States and Israel in 1997 concerned not settlements in the West
Bank but a murder in Maryland.
Initially, this murder did not seem to be destined to turn into
an international incident. On September 19, 1997, the burned
and dismembered body of Enrique Tello, Jr., was discovered by
police in a suburban Maryland neighborhood near the home of
Samuel Sheinbein.' According to area residents, Sheinbein and

his friend Aaron Needle, both seventeen, had been seen pulling a
wheeled cart the previous week on a path near the location where
the body was found. 2 Local police sought Sheinbein and Needle
for questioning in the murder.
3
Rather than face questioning, Sheinbein fled the country.
Five days after the police first sought Sheinbein for questioning,
he turned up in Tel Aviv; located by Israeli police acting on a tip
Based on information
they had received from his family. 4
received from U.S. authorities, Israeli police took Sheinbein into
custody pending application for extradition from the United
5
States.
This was the last event in the Sheinbein case which
resembled an ordinary murder prosecution. Thereafter, events
rapidly mushroomed. Under an Israeli law enacted in 1978, the
Offenses Committed Abroad Act, Israel will not extradite suspects
who were Israeli citizens at the time their alleged offense was
committed. 6 Accordingly, Sheinbein, even though he was born in
the United States and had never lived in Israel, claimed that he

1.
See Karl Vick & Steve Vogel, Teen Detained in Israel After Drug
Overdose, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1997, at Al.
2.
See id.
3.
See id.
4.
See Teen Suspect in MarylandKilling FoundHere, JERUSALEM POST, Sept.
26, 1997, at 4; see also Steve Vogel & Barton Gellman, Access to Crime Scene
Sought, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1997, at H1 (noting that the Sheinbein family was
cooperating with American law enforcement authorities).
5.
See id.
6.
See Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad) § 4a(a) (Isr. 1978).
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was an Israeli citizen. 7 He based his claim on the nationality of
his father, Sol, who was born in territory within the British
Mandate of Palestine, and emigrated to the United States in
1950.8 Sheinbein thus claimed that under the Israeli nationality
law, which grants citizenship to any person with Israeli parents,
he was an Israeli national and could not be extradited. 9
On September 29, after examining Sheinbein's claim, Israeli
diplomats gave notice to the United States that Israel would
refuse to extradite him to face trial in Maryland lo pursuant to the
Offenses Committed Abroad Act.1 1 Instead, as has been the
recent custom between the two countries, 12 they offered to try
him in Israel on the Maryland murder charges. 13 In contrast with
prior precedent, the Israeli government even agreed to bear the
cost of the prosecution. 1 4 Rather than ameliorating the situation,
however, this proposal set off a firestorm of political repercussions
in the United States. Robert Dean, the Maryland prosecutor in
charge of the Tello murder, almost immediately denounced the
Israeli proposal as burdensome and unjust, 15 and expressed
concern that Sheinbein might obtain more lenient treatment in an
Israeli court than in a Maryland tribunal. 16 In addition, as Israeli
officials struggled to find a means of returning Sheinbein to the
United States, Rep. Robert Livingston (R-La.) threatened to
withhold almost $50 million in U.S. aid to Israel if Sheinbein was
not extradited. 17 The Sheinbein case thus managed to do what
even the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations did not dothreaten the long-standing friendly relationship between the
United States and Israel.

7.

See David Briscoe, Israeli Extradition Refusal Brings Threat of Aid

Review, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 30, 1997.

8.
See Barton Gelman & Steve Vogel, IsraelBars Return of Md. Teen, May
Hold Murder Trial There, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
9.
See id.
10.
See id.
11.
See Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad) § 4a(a) (Isr. 1978).
12.
See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (discussing AmericanIsraeli joint prosecutions).
13.
See Gellman & Vogel, supra note 8, at Al.
14.
See Arlo Wagner, Sheinbein Case Turns on Israeli Citizenship, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al; see also Arlo Wagner, Israeli High Court Rejects
Extradition of Sheinbein, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1999, at C9 (stating that
Sheinbein's trial would proceed in Israel and would be paid for by the Israeli
government).
15.
See Peter Slevin, U.S. Pursues Accused Killer, NEw ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 19, 1997, at Al.
16.
See Gellman & Vogel, supranote 8, at Al.
17.
See Barton Gellman & Karl Vick, Parents Allege Sheinbein Was Being
Robbed, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1997, at Bl.
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The political implications of the Sheinbein case, however,
may not be as surprising as they initially seem-because crime
itself has taken on increasing geopolitical significance. In the
past twenty years, drug trafficking and money laundering, along
with other forms of criminal conduct, have become increasingly
transnational.' 8 In pursuit of international cooperation against
these crimes, the United States has increasingly demanded that
other nations cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of
criminals-even to the extent that certain nations view U.S.
pressure as an attack on their sovereignty. 19
Thus, the United States has clashed with nations such as
Mexico, Colombia, and Israel regarding their refusal to extradite
their nationals. 20 The United States has also predicated economic
aid to other nations, such as Nigeria, on cooperation in law
enforcement.2 1 Furthermore, other factors such as differing
standards of due process and differences in substantive criminal
law have increased the difficulty of obtaining extradition and have
strained relations between the United States and foreign
governments.
Accordingly, this Article will examine the political
ramifications of the extradition process and the need for
compromise to prevent domestic politics from undermining the
ends of law enforcement. This Article will also suggest possible
measures to ease the complications that extradition poses to
international law enforcement cooperation. Part II of this Article
will examine the facts of the most recent and dramatic example of
the politics of extradition as played out in the Sheinbein case.
Part III will analyze other issues which have placed obstacles in
the path of practical law enforcement and international relations,
and the way that the United States has reacted to each issue.
Special emphasis will be placed on U.S.-Israeli extradition
problems. Finally, Part IV will discuss compromises which might
be made by the United States and other nations such as Israel to
ease the extradition process, particularly in cases involving a
national of the asylum state, without sacrificing national

sovereignty.

See generally ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS AcROSS BORDERS:
18.
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993).

19.

THE

See, e.g., Caribbean Nations Stand Up to U.S. Over Drugs, REUTERS

NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Dec. 17, 1996.

See How the U.S. State Department Views Money Laundering in Select
20.
Countries, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Apr. 1998, at 11; see also Gregory Gross,
Mexican Judge Rejects ExtraditionBid, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 27, 1998, at B1.
See The United States and Certification, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW,
21.
June 1, 1998, at 23. The procedure by which the President of the United States
can certify or decertify foreign nations for American aid payments based on their
cooperation in drug enforcement is provided in 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1994).
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF SAMUEL SHEINBEIN:
THE APPLIED POLITICS OF EXTRADITION

The major event in Israeli-U.S. relations in 1997 began with a
grisly murder in Maryland. On September 19, 1997, the Maryland
state police located a black plastic bag containing the remains of
22
a dismembered human body burned almost beyond recognition.
The body was later identified as that of Enrique Teilo, Jr., a local
23
teenager.
Police almost immediately suspected Samuel Sheinbein and
Aaron Needle, both seventeen, of the murder. The evidence
against them was plentiful: the body was found in a vacant house
just around the corner from Sheinbein's home; a witness had
seen teenagers matching Sheinbein and Needle's descriptions
struggling to move a tarpaulin covered garden cart toward the
vacant house; a trail of blood was located between Sheinbein's
home and the house where the body was found; and a power saw
was found, near the body, which matched an empty box
discovered at Sheinbein's home. 24 Moreover, subsequent
investigation of the Sheinbein garage revealed the remnants of a
fire which appeared to have been set and extinguished, a box of
commercial fire logs that matched those found around the body, a
handsaw, several bloodstains, surgical gloves, and a box 2 of
garbage bags similar to those used to contain the victim's body.
On Friday, September 19, Sheinbein reportedly told his
family that he was going to Ocean City, Maryland, for the
weekend.2 6 On Monday, however, he had not returned to his
27
home. Instead, on September 21, Sheinbein fled to Israel.
On September 25, Sheinbein's parents notified the
Maryland police of his whereabouts, and stated that they had
negotiated the voluntary return of their son through their
attorney.2 8 Sheinbein's family further notified the police that he
was scheduled to board a nonstop Tel Aviv-to-New York flight

22.
See Vick & Vogel, supra note 1, at Al.
23.
See id.
24.
See Vogel & Gellman, supranote 4, at Hi.
25.
See Fern Shen & Maria Glod, Teen Arrested, Second Sought in Md.
Dismemberment Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at Al.
26.
See Manuel Perez-Rivas & Maria Glod, Md. Teen Sought in Dismemberment Slaying, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at D1.
27.
See Gellman & Vogel, supra note 8, at Al.
28.
See Teen Suspect in Maryland Killing Found Here, supranote 4, at 4; see
also Maria Glod & Steve Vogel, Teen Suspect in Md. Killing Found in Israel, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 25, 1997, at Al (quoting attorney for Sheinbein family as stating that
he was in the process of negotiating Sheinbein's voluntary return).
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the following day. However, Sheinbein failed to emerge from
this flight when it landed at Kennedy Airport in New York. 2 9
Following this, FBI agents informed Israeli authorities of the
existence of a provisional warrant for Sheinbein's arrest in
Maryland.3 0 Working with Israeli authorities, FBI agents located
Sheinbein at Yitzhak Rabin Hospital, where he had been
hospitalized for an apparent drug overdose. 3 ' Shortly thereafter,
Israeli police placed Sheinbein under arrest following a formal
request
for extradition from the United States embassy in Tel
32
Aviv.

The problems of the Maryland authorities appeared to be
over. Israel and the United States have a functioning extradition
treaty,3 3 and Israel had a long-standing history of cooperation
with the United States in law enforcement matters.34 Moreover,
although Sheinbein was to be tried as an adult on first-degree
murder charges in Maryland, he was not eligible for the death
penalty due to his age.3 5 This removed a potential obstacle to
extradition, as Israel has a very limited death penalty statute, and
does not extradite individuals who face capital punishment
36
abroad.
Nevertheless, on September 29, 1997, Israeli authorities
announced that Sheinbein would not be extradited to Maryland
because he held Israeli citizenship. 3 7 Instead, Israel offered to
prosecute Sheinbein for the Maryland homicide at Israeli

expense. 38

From

this point, the

Sheinbein

case

rapidly

transformed into an exercise in domestic and international

politics.
Israel, like many nations, refuses to extradite its nationals for
prosecution in foreign countries.3 9 However, the Israeli-U.S.
extradition relationship is complicated by the terms of the
extradition treaty between Israel and the United States. This

29.

See Vick & Vogel, supra note 1, at Al.

30.
31.
32.

See id.
See id
See Vogel & Gelman, supranote 4, at Hi.

33.
Extradition Convention, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707.
34.
See generally Abraham Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime: Joint
Prosecutions of Israeli Organized Crime Figures by U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1903 (1996).
35.
See Vogel & Gellman, supranote 4, at HI.
36.
See id Israel's death penalty statute is limited to crimes of genocide,
and has only been put into effect on one occasion.
37.
See Gellman & Vogel, supranote 8, at Al.
38.
See Arlo Wagner, Sheinbein Case Turns on Israeli Citizenship, supranote
14, at Al; see also Arlo Wagner, IsraeliHigh Court Rejects Extraditionof Sheinbein,
supra note 14, at C9 (stating that Sheinbein's trial would proceed in Israel and

would be paid for by the Israeli government).
39.
See Slevin, supra note 15, at 1 (citing Germany and France as
examples).
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treaty, concluded in 1962, requires each country to "deliver up
persons found in its territory,"4 ° and specifically prohibits the
refusal of extradition on the grounds that a requested individual
is "a national of the requested Party."4 1 At the same time, the
treaty also specifies that extradition will occur in accordance with
domestic legislation. 4 2
The domestic laws governing extradition proceedings in Israel
were changed after several celebrated cases led the Israeli
government to question the policy of extraditing its own nationals.
The first of these cases occurred in 1962, the same year that the
United States-Israeli extradition treaty was concluded. 43
It
involved Robert Soblen, a U.S. citizen convicted of spying for the
Soviet Union, who fled to Israel."
After considerable public
debate concerning whether Israel should deny sanctuary to a
Jewish immigrant, Soblen was deported and placed on a flight to
the United States. 4 5 While on board the airplane Soblen slashed
his wrists, and later finished committing suicide by ingesting
poison in a London hospital.4 s
Following the death of Soblen, then-opposition leader
Menachem Begin expressed his forceful opposition to the
extradition of any Jew from Israel. 47 In an impassioned article
written in the newspaper of the Likud Party, Begin quoted from
Deuteronomy 23:15: "You shall not give up to his master a slave
who has escaped from his master to you. " 48 As one Israeli
commentator noted, Begin "considered it the role of the Jewish
49
state to give asylum to wanted Jews."
Begin was able to give voice to these sentiments sixteen years
later, as Prime Minister of Israel, following the controversial
decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in Pesachowitz v. Israel.5 0 In
this case, Switzerland sought the extradition of Pesachowitz, an
Israeli citizen, to face fraud charges. 5 1 Pesachowitz argued that
he should not be extradited to Switzerland because Swiss law did

40.
41.
42.
43.
JERUSALEM

Extradition Convention, supra note 33, art. I, 14 U.S.T. at 1708.
Id. art. IV, 14 U.S.T. at 1710.
Id art IX, 14 U.S.T. at 1711.
See Allan E. Shapiro, A Case of More than Disquieting Criticism,
POST, Oct. 24, 1997, at 5; see also Ann LoLordo, To Extradite or Not to
Extradite?, BALT. SUN, Oct. 23, 1997, at 2A.
44.
See LoLordo, supranote 43, at 2AK
45.
See id.

46.

See id

47.
48.
49.

See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting former Israeli cabinet member Arye Naor).

50.
51.

Pesachowitzv. Israel, 31(2) P.D. 449.
Id.
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The Israeli

Supreme Court, however, rejected this implied requirement of
reciprocity and ruled that Pesachowitz should be returned to
53
Switzerland.
Following the Pesachowitz decision, Prime Minister Begin
proposed legislation in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, to
54
prohibit the extradition of Israeli nationals to foreign nations.
The new Israeli extradition legislation, the Offenses Committed
Abroad Act of 1978, was modeled upon the extradition statutes of
nations such as Germany and France, where extradition of
citizens is prohibited or permitted only under narrow
circumstances. 5 5 In essence, the Offenses Committed Abroad Act
provides that an Israeli citizen may not be extradited from Israel
unless he did not hold Israeli citizenship at the time of the alleged
offense.56
In addition to issues of international reciprocity, the debate
over the Offenses Committed Abroad Act was influenced by a fear
of anti-Semitism in foreign courts. Prime Minister Begin, like
many of his countrymen, was a Holocaust survivor, and had an
understandable distaste for turning Jews away from Israeli
sanctuary to face prosecution in foreign courts.5 7 Moreover,
celebrated cases such as the Dreyfus affair and the anti-Zionist
show trials in the Communist bloc undermined Israeli trust in the
fairness of foreign judicial systems toward Jewish defendants. As
one commentator stated, "[i]f Jews could be exterminated for
simply being Jews . .. why should one be surprised if Israel has
an interest in protecting its citizens?"55 Also, many religious
Israelis found support for non-extradition legislation in the tenet
of Jewish law which holds that a Jew should not surrender
59
another Jew or another Jew's property to non-Jews.
The extent of this feeling in Israel was graphically illustrated
by the cases of William Nakash and Shmuel Flatto-Sharon.
Nakash, a Sephardic Jew living in France, was accused of
participating in the 1983 murder of an Arab nightclub owner and
drug dealer. 60 Rather than remaining in France to face trial, he

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
Id.
See Slevin, supranote 15, at Al.
See id.
See Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad) § 4a(a) (Isr. 1978).
See Slevin, supra note 15, at Al.

58.

Id.

59.

See CNN Morning News: Sheinbein May Return to U.S. for Trial (CNN

television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1998), available in LEXIS, Transcript #9803023V09.
60.
See LoLordo, supra note 43, at 2A; Thomas L. Friedman, Is He a Jew in
Danger,or Just a French Outlaw?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1986, at A4.
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fled to Israel and became an Israeli citizen. 6 1 In the meantime, he
was tried in absentia in France, convicted, and sentenced to life
62
imprisonment.
After a hiatus of approximately two years, Nakash surfaced in
Israel and France demanded his extradition.6 3 Even though he
had not been an Israeli citizen at the time of the alleged offense, a
strong current of public opinion in Israel favored allowing him
sanctuary on the grounds that his life would be in danger from
Arab gangs in French prisons.6 4 Among those who supported his
cause was Justice Minister Avraham Sharir, who stated publicly

that "he would rather be known as soft-hearted than bear
responsibility for sending Nakash to his death in a French
prison. " 6 5
Ultimately, however, the Israeli courts ruled that
Nakash was extraditable, and he was returned to France where he
66
was retried and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
The Flatto-Sharon case, also involving France, resulted when
French authorities requested the extradition of Shmuel FlattoSharon on charges of defrauding French citizens of amounts
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. 6 7 Flatto-Sharon secured
sanctuary in Israel by the unusual expedient of using a portion of
his ill-gotten gains to fimance a campaign for election to the
Knesset. 6 s Riding a wave of anti-French sentiment among the
Israeli public due to French refusal to extradite Palestinian
terrorist Abu Daoud to Israel, Flatto-Sharon won enough votes to
take a seat in the Knesset and obtain parliamentary immunity
69
from extradition.
Accordingly, it is apparent that the Offenses Committed
Abroad Act was the product of a national consensus and
represented deep-seated sentiments among the Israeli public
against deporting Jews to face foreign justice. The Israeli concerns
that motivated the 1978 legislation are directly applicable to the
Sheinbein case. Sheinbein's alleged victim was a member of the
Hispanic community, and numerous prominent figures from that
community have publicly called for his extradition.7 0 Given the

61.
62.

See Friedman, supranote 60, at A4.
See id.

63.

See id

64.
65.

See id.
Herb Keinon, Fit to be Tried: But Where?, JERUSALEM PoST, Oct. 17,

1997, at 11.

66.
67.

See icL
See LoLordo, supranote 43, at 2A.

68.
See id.
See Keinon, supranote 65, at 11.
69.
70.
See Brett Marcy & Sean Scufly, Latinos Denounce Israel WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1997, at C7.
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prevalence of Hispanic organizations such as the Latin Kings in
U.S. prisons, it has been argued that Sheinbein's life would be in
danger if he were extradited, much as Nakash claimed that he
was in danger of being murdered by vengeful Arabs if returned to
France.7 1 Thus, despite the fact that Sheinbein never lived in
Israel, and claimed Israeli citizenship only after the offense was
committed, he may be exactly the sort of person that the Offenses
Committed Abroad Act was intended to assist. Despite Israeli
officials' reluctance to allow Sheinbein to stay in Israel, the
political ramifications of returning him were potentially serious.
The Offenses Committed Abroad Act, however, allows an
alternative form of prosecution for Israeli citizens who cannot
legally be extradited. Under the Act, an Israeli citizen who
commits an offense outside Israel may be prosecuted in Israel on
72
the foreign charge, with the assistance of foreign authorities.
This alternative was offered to Maryland authorities in the case of
Sheinbein, and had been utilized successfully on three prior
occasions by prosecutors in the United States in the trials of Isaac
Kirman, Nadav Nakan and Yair Orr, Israel Mizrahi and Joseph
Reisch. 73
Conducting a joint prosecution in Israel involves more than
learning to navigate new rules of criminal procedure. U.S.
prosecutors, quite logically, cannot file charges against suspects
in Israeli courts on their own authority. Commencing a trial in
Israel under the Offenses Committed Abroad Act 7 requires a
formal application by the U.S. prosecutor to the Israeli Ministry of
Justice, transmitted through both the United States Justice
Department and the State Department."5 In the case of Isaac
Kirman, a small-time drug dealer who fled to Israel in 1983, this
resulted in a delay of nearly ten years in bringing him to trial. The

71.
See CNN Morning News, supra note 59 (quoting Sheinbein attorney
David Liba'i as stating that someone might "take revenge" on him if he were
extradited); CNN Worldview: Israel Rules Sheinbein Goes to U.S. (CNN television
broadcast, Oct. 20, 1997), available in LEXIS, Transcript #97102002 18 (stating
that "[plrivately, some Israelis fear for Sheinbein's life in an American prison if he's
convicted of dismembering a Hispanic teenager).
72.
See Abramovsky, PartnersAgainst Crime, supranote 34, at 1914 (citing
Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad) § 4a(a) (Isr. 1978)).
73.
See id. Kirman was accused of selling narcotics in New York, Nakan
and Orr were accused of murder in California, and Mizrahi and Reisch were
accused of murdering a Russian gangster in Brooklyn. See id. For an excellent
and thorough discussion of the Kirman case by one of the participating
prosecutors, see generally Mark D. Cohen, New York v. Kirman/Israel v. Kirman:
A Prosecutionin Tel Aviv Under IsraeliLaw for a Narcotics Offense Committed in New
York, 4 CRIM. L.F. 597 (1993).
See Penal Law (Offenses Committed Abroad) § 4a(a) (Isr. 1978)
74.
(allowing Israeli courts to try suspects for offenses committed outside Israel which
are extraditable offenses under the Extradition Law of 1954).
See Abramovsky, PartnersAgainst Crime, supranote 34, at 1914.
75.
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relevant laws had never been utilized before, and delays resulted
while both countries developed acceptable procedures.7 6 By the
time the relevant applications had been made, Israeli prosecutors
had traveled to Suffolk County, New York, to gather evidence to
support the accusation, and charges were ultimately filed.7 7 Five

years had passed.78 By then, Kirman had completed his army
service and disappeared. 7 9 It was not until 1993 that he was
apprehended after being stopped in Tel Aviv for a routine traffic
80
violation.
Subsequent U.S.-Israeli joint prosecutions, however, have
had the benefit of established procedure, thus minimizing delays.
When Israel Mizrahi and Joseph Reisch were prosecuted in Tel
Aviv for the Brooklyn murder of Russian gangster Michael
Markowitz, the time lag from the death of Markowitz to the arrest
81
of Mizrahi and Reisch in Israel was a little more than four years.
"In fact, due to streamlined procedures and more efficacious
apprehension of the suspects in Israel, the trial of Yair Orr and
Nadav Nakan, Israelis accused of committing murder in
California, was held before the Kirman trial even though their
offense was committed at a later date." 82

By this time, as well,

Israeli and U.S. police had become more used to working together,
developing a certain mutual familiarity with each other's systems
that enabled them to effectively bypass procedure.8 3 Moreover,
precedent existed for the transportation of witnesses and evidence
to Israel, including members of the Federal Witness Protection
84
Program, to assist Israeli prosecutors in obtaining convictions.
Thus, by the time Sheinbein was arrested in Israel, an
efficient and tested mechanism existed for prosecution of IsraeliU.S. suspects in Israel. Unlike previous cases, however, Maryland
authorities quickly rejected the Israeli offer to try Sheinbein in
Israel, even though the Israeli government offered to pay the cost
of Sheinbein's prosecution." This anomaly, as with many other
factors in the Sheinbein case, has its roots in domestic politics.

76.

See id.

77.

See id.

78.
79.

See id.
See id.

80.

See id.

81.

See Robert E. Kessler, Two Fugitives Arrested, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 30,

1993, at 31.
82.

Abramovsky, PartnersAgainst Crime, supra note 34, at 1914.

83.
See id. at 1914-15; see also Miles Corwin, Israel Tries 2 Men in Killing of
Montecito Couple, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1990, at A3.
84.
See Abramovsky, PartnersAgainst Crime, supranote 34, at 1915.
85.
See Arlo Wagner, Sheinbein Case Turns on IsraeliCitizenship, supranote
14, at Al; see also Arlo Wagner, IsraeliHigh Court Rejects ExFradition of Sheinbein,
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Robert Dean, the State's Attorney in Montgomery County,
Maryland, faced a tough re-election battle in 1998.86 Dean's reelection effort was complicated by the fact that he had failed to
secure convictions in two high-profile cases and by political
fallout from a 1997 sexual harassment claim filed by a senior
prosecutor.8 7 In addition, Dean had been accused of abusing his
authority by stuffing the mailboxes of county law enforcement
officials with flyers for a political fund-raising event.8 8
The battle over Sheinbein's extradition was a ready-made
opportunity for Dean to remedy his political difficulties.
Sheinbein's alleged victim, Enrique Tello, was Hispanic, and Dean
saw the opportunity to improve his position with Montgomery
County's large population of Hispanic voters by demanding that
Sheinbein be returned to Maryland. By doing so, and by rejecting
every Israeli attempt at compromise, Dean positioned himself as a
defender of U.S. sovereignty and the rights of Maryland's Hispanic
community. 9
Dean's call for Sheinbein's extradition was soon taken up by
national political figures. Israeli-U.S. relations were already
strained over the stalled Middle East peace process, and several
legislators at the federal level saw Israel's refusal to extradite
Sheinbein as another provocation of the United States. Rep.
Robert L. Livingston, the chair of the House Appropriations
Committee, and then a leading candidate to succeed Newt
Gingrich as Speaker of the House, 90 stated that the Sheinbein
incident offended his "sensibilities as a citizen of the United
States."9 1 Upon receiving a letter of protest from Livingston,
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright personally contacted
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ask for his
"maximum cooperation" in the Sheinbein case. 92

supra note 14, at C9 (stating that Sheinbein's trial would proceed in Israel and
would be paid for by the Israeli government).
86.
See Katherine Shaver, Jury's Out on Montgomery Prosecutor, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 26, 1998, at Bi.
87.
See id.
88.
See Arlo Wagner, Loser Dean is Bruised,WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1998, at

C3.
89.
See Barton Gellman & Steve Vogel, Israel to Seek Sheinbein's
Extradition, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 20, 1997, at Al (noting anger within the Maryland
Hispanic community at Israeli extradition law); see also Marcy & Scully, supranote

70, at C7.
90.
See David W, Chen, A Livingston Legacy Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1998, at B1. However, on the day following his election as Speaker, Livingston
resigned amid fallout from his admission to having an extramarital affair. See
Nancy E. Roman, House Shellshocked as Livingston Resigns, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20,

1998, at Al.
91.
Gellman & Vick, supranote 17, at Bi.
92.
See Susan Levine & Barton Gellman, Albright Urges Israel to Extradite
Md. Teenager in Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at B1.
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Rep. Livingston's efforts, however, went considerably beyond a
protest note to the Secretary of State. On October 15, 1997, a House
subcommittee which reported to Livingston's Appropriations
Committee froze approximately $76 million in U.S. aid payments to
Israel.9 3 Although the frozen aid payments were ultimately restored,
Livingston cited the Sheinbein incident as a key reason why Israel
94
deserved punishment in the form of delays or cuts in U.S. aid.
The growing political firestorm left Israeli authorities on the
horns of a dilemma. From the beginning, Israeli law enforcement
officials repeatedly stated that they did not want Sheinbein in
Israel and that they were searching for a legal means to return
him to the United States. 95 While this willingness to cooperate
was without doubt motivated in part by concern for Israel's
standing as a law-abiding nation, the primary motivation was
Israel's need to preserve good political relations with the United
States. This political motivation is evidenced by the fact that
Israel had refused on numerous prior occasions to extradite
Israeli citizens to the United States. 9 6
Yet, in the face of
increasing pressure from influential U.S. figures, the Israeli
government backed away from its prior stance and sought to
97
expel Sheinbein to face trial in Maryland.
However, if Sheinbein was determined to be an Israeli citizen,
Israeli authorities would be required to violate their own law to
extradite him, and a precedent would be set that would likely be
used against Israel by states requesting extradition in the future.
Thus, Israeli officials followed a dual course of action: on the one
hand, they sought an Israeli court ruling holding that Sheinbein
was not an Israeli citizen, and on the other hand they suggested
various means by which the extradition deadlock might be broken
through compromise. Thus far, the judicial strategy has been the
more successful.
Sheinbein was born in the United States and had never lived

in Israel. However, he steadfastly claimed that he was an Israeli
citizen under an Israeli law that allows a child to claim citizenship

93.
See Matthew Doff, Congress Steps Up Pressure on Israel to Extradite
Suspect, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, Oct. 15, 1997 (visited Feb. 10, 1998)
<http://www.softlineweb.com>.
94.
See id-

95.

See Thomas W. Lippman & Barton Gellman, Israel Still Seeks Legal Way

to Return Suspect to U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at B1.
96.
See Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime, supra note 34, at 1914-15
(discussing cases where Israel prosecuted Israeli fugitives for crimes in the United
States rather than extraditing them).
97.
See Fern Shen & James Rupert, Extradition Battle to Resume After
Cease-Fire,WAsH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1998, at A9.
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His father, Sol Sheinbein, was born in

British-governed Palestine in 1944, and emigrated to the United
States in 1950. 9 9 Thus, the elder Sheinbein had lived in Israel for
two years after the creation of the Israeli state on May 14, 1948.
Moreover, Sol Sheinbein has held a valid Israeli passport since
1976, and the Israeli government has not challenged his claim of
citizenship.10° Thus, Sheinbein has at least a colorable claim to
citizenship under Israeli law.
The law of citizenship under which Sheinbein claims Israeli
nationality, however, was not passed until 1952, two years after
Sol Sheinbein emigrated to the United States.' 0 1 Moreover,
evidence existed that Sol Sheinbein's parents may have
renounced their Israeli citizenship when they emigrated to the
United States in 1950.102 The Israeli Attorney General's office,
which sought the extradition of Sheinbein, presented documents
signed by Sheinbein's paternal grandparents upon leaving
10 4
Israel' 0 3 in which they stated that they had "no citizenship."
Thus, Israeli authorities argued that Sheinbein's grandparents
made an effective renunciation of citizenship that precludes him
from claiming Israeli nationality.' 0 s However, Sheinbein's
Deborah Levinger, undermined the Israeli
grandmother,
authorities' position when she testified on March 18, 1998, that
she had only signed these exit documents because she had been
threatened and beaten by her husband.' ° 6 If Levinger's
renunciation was not voluntary, Sol Sheinbein would be able to
claim Israeli citizenship through her, and Samuel Sheinbein could
in turn claim Israeli nationality through Sol.
The other means by which Israeli authorities have sought to

break the Sheinbein deadlock is through attempts to reach a
compromise. On February 26, 1998, Moshe Ravid, the Israeli
judge presiding over the Sheinbein citizenship hearing, proposed
that Sheinbein voluntarily return to the United States to face
prosecution with the understanding that he would be returned to
Israel to serve his sentence if convicted.' 0 7 Initially, this seemed

Law on Citizenship (Isr. 1952), 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952).
98.
See Shen & Rupert, supranote 97.
99.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Ramit Plushnick, GrandmotherTestifies At Sheinbein Hearing,WASH.
POST, Mar. 18, 1998, at B5.
103. See Shen & Rupert, supranote 97, at A9.
104. See Plushnick, GrandmotherTestifies At Sheinbein Hearing, supra note
102, at B5.
105, See Shen & Rupert, supranote 97, at A9.
106. See Plushnick, GrandmotherTestifies At Sheinbein Hearing, supra note
102, at B5.
107. See Lee Hockstader & Ramit Plushnick, Judge Proposes Compromise in
Sheinbein Case, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1998, at A18.
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to be a feasible alternative. Sheinbein's Israeli attorney said that
he would seriously consider the Ravid Proposal,' 0 8 which would
have alleviated Sheinbein's concerns about the danger to his life
in U.S. prisons while enabling Maryland authorities to conduct a
trial in Maryland courts under Maryland law. Moreover, both the
United States and Israel are signatories to a multilateral treaty,
the Strasbourg Convention, under which convicted criminals may
be transferred to prisons in their native countries.' 0 9
This proposal, however, was quickly rejected by Maryland
authorities." 0 Under the Strasbourg Convention, a country to

which a prisoner is transferred has the discretion to review and
reduce a sentence imposed by a foreign court."'
Maryland
authorities argued that Israel, which does not impose sentences
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, might
exercise this discretion to release Sheinbein after serving less time
than he would in a Maryland prison." 2 In a move that revealed
Dean's effort to obtain a high-profile conviction prior to the 1998
election, he stated that his office would consider the Israeli offer,
1 13
but only if Sheinbein agreed to waive trial and plead guilty.
Ultimately, the Israeli Attorney General's judicial strategy
proved more fruitful. On September 6, 1998, Judge Ravid ruled
that Sheinbein could be extradited, albeit in a manner which
raised questions as to the legality of his ruling." 4 Rejecting the
evidence that Sheinbein's grandparents had renounced their
Israeli citizenship, he ruled that Sol Sheinbein-and therefore his
son Samuel-was an Israeli citizen." 5 However, he held that
aSheinbein is not enough of a citizen to deserve protection under
Israeli law" because he had never lived in Israel, used a U.S.
passport, and had no meaningful connections to the State of
Israel." 6 Judge Ravid ruled that "[a] citizenship that is empty of

108.

See id.

109.

Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced

Persons, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Ses., Doc. No. 167 (1997). This convention
provided additional mechanisms for enforcement of the Convention on the Transfer
of Sentenced Persons, Eur. Consult. Ass., 21st Sess., Doc. No. 112 (1983)
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention 1983].
110.
See Scott Wilson & Ramit Plushnick, Prosecutor Declines Sheinbein
Proposal,WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at D1.
111. See Strasbourg Convention 1983, supranote 109, at art. 9, 11.
112.
See Ramit Plushnick, Sheinbein Prosecutor Ties Israeli Prison Stay to
Guilty Plea, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at A29.
113.
See id.
114.
See Lee Hockstader, Judge Says Israel Can FxtraditeSheinbein, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 7, 1998, at Al.
115.
See id.
116.
See id.
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meaning and all feelings and interest is not enough to afford
117
protection from extradition."
This decision came under instant criticism from the defense
camp. Sheinbein's attorney, former Israeli Justice Minister David
Liba'i, characterized Judge Ravid's ruling as "absurd," stating that
"you are either a citizen, or you aren't." 1 18 Liba'i's comments
echoed a more colorful description of the Israeli Attorney
General's argument that was voiced the previous year on CNN by
Dr. Abraham Abramovsky, who stated that such a plastic

definition of citizenship is "like being half pregnant."
The novelty of Judge Ravid's definition of citizenship also
called into question the finality of his decision. Judge Ravid's
ruling echoes a proposal made by Israeli legislator Amnon
Rubinstein, who proposed that Israeli citizens who reside abroad
for long periods or lack meaningful ties to Israel should not come
under the protection of the Offenses Committed Abroad Act. 1 19
However, the Rubinstein proposal has not yet been acted upon by
the Knesset. By effectively taking it upon himself to play the role
of legislator, Judge Ravid cast considerable doubt on whether his
ruling would withstand the inevitable appeal. In addition, the
Israeli ruling called into question whether Sheinbein would be
eligible to serve his sentence in Israel under the Strasbourg
Convention. 120 Although his Israeli nationality has apparently
been acknowledged, his "lack of meaningful contact" with Israel
may also influence the Israeli and U.S. courts' willingness to
accept his citizenship for purposes of transfer of penal sanctions.
Thus, Judge Ravid may have unwittingly foreclosed his own prior
compromise proposal.
The fears of American law enforcement officials concerning
the validity of Judge Ravid's decision were realized on February
25, 1999, when a panel of the Israeli Supreme Court determined
12 1
in a 3-2 decision that Sheinbein could not be extradited.
Expressing the majority opinion over a stinging dissent by Chief

117. See id. Ironically, even if Samuel Sheinbein is ultimately extradited, Sol
Sheinbein probably has sufficient ties to Israel to avoid extradition under the
standard set by Judge Ravid, as he was born in Israel and carries an Israeli

passport. See Shen & Rupert, supra note 97, at A9. Thus, it is unlikely that Sol
Sheinbein will face trial on the obstruction of justice charges which have been
lodged against him in Maryland.
118. Hockstader, supranote 114, at Al.
119. See Keinon, supranote65, at 11.
120. See Strasbourg Convention 1983, supra note 109, at art. 3(1)(a)
(specifying requirement that transfer only be allowed if the convicted is a national
of the administering State).
121.
See Arlo Wagner, Israeli High Court Rejects Extradition of Sheinbein,
supra note 14, at C9.
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Justice Aharon Barak, 1 22 Justice Theodor Orr rejected Judge
Ravid's conception of Israeli citizenship, holding that Israel would
not recognize two categories of citizenship in the absence of
legislative authorization. 123 In addition, while noting that the
Offenses Committed Abroad Act violated Israel's 1962 extradition
treaty with the United States, Justice Orr determined that Israeli
domestic law held primacy and that the Israeli courts were bound
12 4
to enforce the law as long as it was on the books.
The Israeli government responded to the Supreme Court's
decision by requesting a rehearing en banc. 12 s However, the high
court had only granted such a rehearing once in its fifty-year
history, and, on March 22, 1999, refused the government's
petition in regard to the Sheinbein case. 12 6 This decision
destroyed the final hope of Israeli and American authorities for
Sheinbein's extradition, as the Rubinstein legislation would not
operate retroactively even if passed by the Knesset. 12 7 Instead,
on the same day that the Supreme Court rejected the

government's petition for rehearing, Sheinbein was indicted on
128
charges of first degree murder in the District Court of Tel Aviv.
A trial on the Sheinbein case in Tel Aviv is anticipated in early
1999, although this timetable may be drastically affected by the
strategy of Sheinbein's defense attorneys and the willingness of
12 9
American authorities to cooperate with the Israeli prosecutors.
Ironically, the event most likely to break the Sheinbein logjam may
not be any ruling by an Israeli court but the election of a new State's
Attorney in Montgomery County, Maryland. On September 15, 1998,

122.
See id. (quoting Barak's dissent as stating: "How can one imagine that
a foreign citizen, whose affinity is with a foreign country, can argue before Israeli
courts that he does not trust the laws of his country and its jurisprudence?").
123.
See id.
124.
See id125.
See Israel's Highest Court Rejects Final Appeal to Extradite U.S. Teen,
BALT. SUN, Mar. 22, 1999, at 2B.
126.
Id.
127.
See Lenny Ben-David, ForIsrael, No More Sheinbeins, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 1999, at A16 (stating that the Rubinstein proposal had passed the Judiciary
Committee of the Knesset but would not operate retroactively). However, American
courts have held that retroactivity in extradition legislation is not barred by the
prohibition against ex post facto laws, raising the possibility that Israel-which
follows the Anglo-American common law tradition-might succeed in extraditing
Sheinbein if the Rubinstein legislation is amended to provide for retroactivity. See
McMullen v. United States, 989 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1993) (en bane) (stating that
retroactive application of an amendment to the United States-United Kingdom
extradition treaty did not violate constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto

legislation or bills of attainder).
128.
See Teen Indicted in Israel,NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1999, at A22 (stating that
arraignment was expected to proceed within one month and that trial would
commence in six to nine months).

129.

See id.
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Dean's re-election bid was defeated by the Democratic primary
victory of Douglas Gansler, a thirty-five-year-old former federal
prosecutor. 13 0 The new State's Attorney, Gansler, who was elected in
the general election of November 3, 1998,131 may break the
Sheinbein impasse by adopting a more conciliatory stance toward the
Israeli position. 132 Nevertheless, substantial damage has already
been done; the long-standing tradition of U.S.-Israeli law enforcement
cooperation has become hostage to U.S. domestic politics.
III.

DETAILS, DETAILS: POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH CAUSE DIFFICULTY TO
THE UNITED STATES IN OBTAINING EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTS

The Sheinbein case is only the most recent and furthest
reaching example of the manner in which the pursuit of fugitives
has complicated international relations. In addition to the
problem posed by countries that refuse to extradite their own
nationals, several other measures taken by or against the United
States have hindered both diplomacy and international law
enforcement. These can be broken down into three general
categories: (1) refusal of extradition due to conflicts in criminal
procedural rights, (2) resort to extralegal means to obtain
extradition, and (3) differences in substantive criminal law.
A. Differing Legal Systems
One issue which has stymied both past and present
extradition efforts is the differences in criminal procedure
between the United States and asylum nations. Although, under
the doctrine of non-inquiry, United States courts do not normally
examine the due process standards of foreign criminal justice
systems prior to granting requests for extradition, 13 the judicial
systems of certain other nations refuse to extradite suspects to
countries whose laws do not comport with their own standards of
due process. 134 When extradition to the United States is refused

See Wagner, Loser Deanis Bruised, supranote 88, at C3.
See Katherine Shaver & Michael E. Ruane, The 1998 Election:
Montgomery County; 'Democratic Tde" Prevails as Party Reasserts Power, WASH.
130.
131.

PosT, Nov. 4, 1998, at A44.
132.
See Israel's Highest Court Rejects Final Appeal to Extradite U.S. Teen,
supra note 125, at 2B (noting that Gansler expressed disappointment at the
decision of the Israeli Supreme Court but recognized the efforts of the Israeli

government to extradite Sheinbein and promised to cooperate with Israel).
133. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in
the InternationalRendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 813,
842 (1993).
134.

See Id. at 814.
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on these grounds, the political blow to the U.S. government is
twofold: not only are the U.S. authorities denied jurisdiction over
a fugitive, but U.S. justice has effectively been condemned in a
foreign court.
A case in point was the recent attempt by the United States
to obtain the extradition of Ira Einhorn from France. Einhorn, a
popular guru of 1960s Philadelphia, "was locally famous for
speaking at the first Earth Day, opposing the Vietnam War, and
passing out marijuana joints at public occasions."13 5 Holly
Maddux, a Texas native attracted to the counterculture, met
Einhorn in Philadelphia and lived with him for five years during
the 1970s. 13 6 After a stormy relationship, Maddux decided in
September of 1977 to leave Einhom, following which Einhorn flew
into a rage and threatened to dump her belongings in the
street.13 7 Maddux telephoned her family, and told them that she
was going to Einhorn's apartment to "calm [him] down."13 8 She
13 9
was never seen alive again.
Following Maddux' death, Einhorn refused to answer
questions posed by detectives and would not allow them to enter
his apartment. 14° However, he was not charged with Maddux'
murder until two years later, when a neighbor noticed an

unpleasant odor coming from his apartment.1 4 1 This time, police
obtained a search warrant for Einhorn's residence, and discovered
Maddux' body in a closet along with three air fresheners. 142 Her
1
skull had been broken in thirteen places. 4
Subsequently, Einhorn was charged with first degree murder
in Maddux' death. 14 As a local celebrity with strong ties to the
community, he was freed on four thousand dollar bond. 145 He
attended pretrial hearings, but disappeared on the eve of trial in
1981.146 Some twelve years later, after attempts to capture him
had proved fruitless, Einhorn was tried in absentia and convicted
14 7
of murder by a Philadelphia jury.

135.
See Jack Broom, Sister Won't Rest Until Killer Isn't Free in France,
SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, Dec. 21, 1997, at 17A.
136.
See id.
137.
See id.
138.
See id.
139.
See id.
140.
See id.
141.
See id.
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
144.
See French Reject Extradition of Ex-U.S. Guru, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 5, 1997, at 12A.

145.

See Broom, supra note 135, at 17A.

146.

See FrenchReject Extraditionof Ex-U.S. Guru, supra note 144, at 12A.

147.

See id.
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In the meantime, Einhorn had managed to remain one step
ahead of the FBI, living in Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, Spain,
Denmark, and Sweden. 148 Around the time of his Philadelphia
conviction, he moved to France and lived quietly for four years in
the village of Champagne-Mouton with his Swedish wife.1 4 9 In
June 1997, however, Einhorn's wife applied for a driver's license
in nearby Bordeaux, and her name 'came up in a French
government computer as being linked to an international
fugitive. 150 Acting on a request from the FBI, French police
arrested Einhorn, and he was bound over to a French court for
extradition proceedings. 151

The matter of Einhorn's extradition was immediately
complicated by differences in due process standards between the
U.S. and French judicial systems. Under French law, a fugitive
who is tried and convicted in absentia is entitled to a new trial if
he subsequently surrenders or is captured.' 5 2 In Pennsylvania,
after a conviction in absentia
however, the right to a new trial
53
does not automatically attach. 1
At the time, however, U.S. experts believed that this would
not be an obstacle to Einhorn's extradition.' 5 4 The extradition
treaty between the United States and France did not specifically
forbid extradition of fugitives who had been convicted in absentia,
and contained no exceptions under which Einhorn could claim
protection. 1 55 Moreover, U.S. courts had granted extradition in
prior cases where fugitives had been convicted in absentia in
foreign countries, 156 and the ratification of an extradition treaty
carries a strong expectation, although not a requirement, of
15 7
reciprocity.
Nevertheless, a French magistrates' court in the city of
Bordelais ruled in September of 1997 that Einhorn could not be
extradited because he would not be guaranteed a retrial if
returned to the United States.' 5 8 Instead, he was freed on his
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ford, 715 A.2d 1141 (1998).
See Sandy Schopbach, French Court Delays Decision on Einhorn and
Sets a Hearing, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 24, 1997, at A3 (statement of Joel
Rosen, assistant district attorney who successfully prosecuted Einhorn in 1993).
155. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-Fr., 37 Stat. 1526, amended by
Supplementary Convention, Feb. 12, 1970, U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407.
156. See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960). Some American
courts, however, have required independent findings of probable cause before
extraditing a person convicted in absentia. See id. at 79.
157. See Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities:
ExtraditionUnder the CanadianCharter,23 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 167 (1998).
158. See FrenchReject Extraditionof Ex-U.S. Guru, supranote 144, at 12A.
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own recognizance and resumed his peaceful existence in rural
France.1 5 9 This ruling was upheld by the Bordeaux Court of
Appeals in December, 160 and ultimately by France's highest
constitutional court, 16 1 despite the passage of a special law by the
Pennsylvania legislature in January 1998 guaranteeing Einhorn a
62
retrial if extradited to the United States.'
Not unsurprisingly, this was "received as a slap in the face by
American prosecutors." 163 Effectively, the French court had
branded the U.S. justice system as lacking in fundamental
fairness; in fact, the magistrate who ruled on the United States's
original extradition application "reproached the American justice
system for not respecting the fundamental guarantee of procedure
and the protection of the rights of the defense to the degree
accorded in France."' 64 While such decisions may be momentarily
satisfying to asylum states, they can also undermine law
enforcement cooperation in the long term by rendering the
requesting state less willing to offer assistance in future cases
where extradition is requested.
B. IrregularRendition and Abduction
Political difficulties can also arise when the United States,
frustrated with obstacles in the regular extradition process,
resorts to extralegal means to obtain jurisdiction over fugitives.
This most often occurs when a suspect flees to a nation with
which the United States has no extradition treaty, or where
foreign law prevents the implementation of the normal extradition
process.
U.S. authorities' use of extralegal means to return fugitives to
the United States can be divided into two categories. The first,
irregular rendition, is a cooperative process under which the law
enforcement authorities of the asylum state deliver the suspect to
their counterparts in the requesting state outside the formal
extradition process.' 65 The second, abduction, is a unilateral

159. See Broom, supra note 135, at 17A.
160. See Herzberg Nathaniel, La car d'appel de Bourdeauxrefuse l'extradition
de Pancien leader hippie Ira Einhom [The Bordeaux Court of Appeals Refuses the
Extradition of Former Hippie Leader Ira Einhorn], LE MONDE, Dec. 6, 1997
[hereinafter The Bordeaux Court of Appeals].
161. See French Court Rules Against Extradition, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
14, 1998, at 19A.
162. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §9543(c) (West 1988).
163. FrenchReject Extraditionof Ex-U.S. Guru, supranote 144, at 12A.
164. The Bordeaux Court of Appeals, supra note 160.
165. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition
Devices as Alternatives to Extradition,7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 33-37 (1973).
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process under which the requesting state arranges the capture
and transportation of the suspect without the knowledge or
permission of the asylum state.1 66 These methods, especially the
second, have often been used by the United States in obtaining
fugitives from Latin American countries that have been
historically regarded as within the U.S. sphere of influence, and
that contain narcotics trafficking organizations which are of
particular concern to U.S. law enforcement. 167 In fact, both
former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and President Bill
Clinton have sanctioned the use of unilateral abduction in U.S.
law enforcement, particularly in cases involving drugs or
terrorism. 168
The legality of irregular rendition has been upheld repeatedly
by the U.S. courts under the "Ker-Frisbie doctrine," established in
6 9 Both cases upheld the
Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins.1
apprehension of a suspect via irregular means so that he could be
brought into the jurisdiction where his crimes were committed,
whether international or interstate. 170
Until the 1970s, the use of irregular rendition by the United
States was uncommon and generally limited to high-profile
cases.171 With the rise of international drug trafficking in the
1970s, however, irregular rendition became more common,
especially from Latin American drug source and trans-shipment
countries. 172 In many cases, U.S. efforts to obtain extradition
were stymied by laws of the requested state that restricted the
extradition of nationals or by corrupt Latin American judicial
systems. As a result, extrajudicial cooperation with Latin
American police agencies was sought by the United States. 173 In
the case of drug traffickers who were not citizens of the nations in

166.

167.

See id. at 28-33.

See Panama:Acquittal of Suspects in Kiling of U.S. Soldier Sets Off U.S.-

Panama Feud, IAC NEWSL. DATABASE, Nov. 13, 1997 (quoting unnamed State
Department officials as stating that unilateral abductions were "fairly common" in
Latin America).
168. See John Diamond, U.S. Wdling to Use Force to Apprehend Terrorists,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A9.
169. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952).
170. See id. at 522; Ker, 119 U.S. at 443-44.
171. See Nadelmann, supra note 133, at 860. These included, for example,
the case of Samuel Insull, a major Chicago financier accused of fraud who was
seized in 1934 by Turkish police aboard a Greek ship in Turkish waters after futile
attempts by the United States to obtain his extradition from Greece. See United
States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. IMI.1934). Similarly, in 1951, Mexican police
seized accused spy Morton Sobell, an associate of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and
delivered him to the United States with the assistance of the FBI. See United
States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957).
172. See Nadelmann, supra note 133, at 861.
173. Id.

1999]

THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN EXTRADITION EXPERIENCE

327

which they resided, such cooperation was often easy to obtain; in
the early 1970s, almost sixty major drug traffickers were deported
from Latin American countries without formal extradition
procedures and subsequently arrested by U.S. authorities. 17 4 In
some cases, extrajudicial cooperation was extended to apprehend
drug traffickers living in their native countries. For example, in
"Operation Grab-Bag" newly-installed Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet seized approximately twenty Chileans wanted by the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and turned them over to the
United States in early 1974.175
Beginning in the 1980s, U.S. law enforcement authorities
adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude toward irregular
rendition, especially in the apprehension of suspected terrorists
or drug traffickers.
The irregular rendition of Juan MattaBallesteros, a Honduran drug trafficker implicated in the 1985
murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena is illustrative.17 6 The
United States was unable to obtain the extradition of MattaBallesteros from Honduras because Honduran law forbade the
extradition of Honduran citizens, 17 7 and because MattaBallesteros had acquired substantial influence within the
Honduran government.17 8
Thus, in 1988, Honduran military
officials accompanied by U.S. Marshals arrested Matta-

Ballesteros, drove him to the airport, and flew him to the United
States. 17 9 Despite street protests in Honduras that resulted in
the American embassy being set afire by a mob, no formal protest
was lodged by the Honduran government.' 8 0
The second method of extralegal rendition, outright abduction
of suspects by U.S. law enforcement agencies, has a long and
troubled history, especially in drug cases and those involving

174. Id. Cases where such deportations have been upheld by American
courts include United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendants
deported from Panama to Puerto Rico at the request of DEA agents), and United
States v. Herrera,504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (Colombian national arrested in
Peru at the request of American agents during a stopover on a Chile-Ecuador flight
and deported to Miami). Another recent instance of rendition through deportation
occurred in 1992 when Israeli drug trafficker Eli Ohana was deported from Bolivia
to face heroin importation charges in New York City. See One of the Chiefs of
IsraeliOrganizedCrime in New York is Capturedin Bolivia, MA'ARIV, Nov. 27, 1991.
175.

See Nadelmann, supranote 133, at 861.

176. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990); see
also Doyle McManus & Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Aides Link HonduranMilitary Chief,
Drug Trade, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1 (stating that Matta-Ballesteros was one
of several suspects implicated in the Camerena murder).
177. See id. at 256.
178. See id.
179. See id
180. See Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Solar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1044
(S.D. I. 1988), affid, 896 F.2d. 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
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abduction of suspects from Third World countries. The legality of
international abductions by U.S. law enforcement agents has
been upheld by U.S. courts with very few limitations. In United
States v. Toscanino,18 l for example, the Second Circuit heard the
case of an Italian national, accused of smuggling narcotics into
the United States, who was kidnapped in Uruguay by Uruguayan
agents and driven to Brazil, where he was interrogated and
tortured by Brazilian police with the awareness of U.S. law
enforcement agencies.132 After seventeen days in Brazil,
Toscanino was drugged and put on an airplane to the United
States.1 8 3
The Second Circuit reiterated the Ker-Frisbie provision that
"due process [is] limited to the guarantee of a constitutionally fair
trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was obtained
over the defendant."18 4 Noting an "erosion of Frisbie,"185 however,
the Toscanino court held that a foreign national who is the victim
of an unreasonable search or seizure conducted by U.S. law
enforcement agents outside the United States was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. 8 6 The Toscanino court
thus required that the United States 'divest itself of jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the
result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and
87
unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."
The kidnapping itself, however, was not held by the
Toscanino court to constitute such a violation. Rather,
Toscanino's Fourth Amendment rights would only be deemed

violated if it could be shown that the abduction was conducted in
a manner that "shocked the conscience"1 8 8 and was accomplished
at the direction or with the active participation of U.S. officials.1 8 9
On remand, the trial court found that, although U.S. law
enforcement agents had known of the kidnapping, they had not
been involved in Toscanino's torture and that Toscanino need not
be released. 190
In Lujan v. Gengler,19 1 a decision rendered the same year as
Toscanino, the Second Circuit again "decline[d] to adopt . .. the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
165, 169
189.
190.
191.

500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
See id at 269-70.
See id at 270.
See id at 272.
See id at 273.
See id. at 280.
Id at 275.
Id at 273 (quoting Justice Franldurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
(1952)).
Seeidat281.
See United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
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extreme remedy of requiring dismissal of the indictment" against
an abducted suspect on the grounds that "adoption of an
exclusionary rule here would confer total immunity to criminal
prosecution." 19 2 The constitutional protection enjoyed by foreign
nationals abducted by U.S. agents was again drastically limited to
kidnappings that were "so shocking that the abduction
constituted a denial of due process." 193 It is essential to note here
that no U.S. court has ever found that the actions of U.S. law
enforcement agents abroad were sufficiently shocking to the
conscience, no matter what the circumstances alleged. 194 In fact,
not only has no U.S. court ever invoked the "Toscanino exception,"
the Seventh Circuit rejected the exception outright in Matta195
Ballesteros v. Henman.
Although the Lujan court also limited the recourse that
abductees might have to international law, holding that
"abduction from another country violates international law only
when the offended state objects to the conduct," 19 6 the United
97
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Alvarez-Machain'
that even a timely objection by the government of the offended
state may not be sufficient to render an U.S. abduction of a
foreign national illegal. 198
The defendant, Humberto AlvarezMachain, was kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara,
Mexico, by paid agents of the United States DEA. 19 9 Following his
abduction, the Mexican government "made several specific formal

192.

Id. at 68 n.9.

193.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992).

194.

Examples of cases in which the "Toscanino exception" has been invoked

but denied include United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that American agents were involved in defendant's kidnapping and torture
in Peru); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283, 284 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
defendant, abducted and tortured for eight days in the Dominican Republic, could
not invoke the Toscanino exemption unless "the United States or its agents played
a direct role" in his torture and interrogation); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896,
902 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the Toscanino exception did not apply to agents
who threatened a fugitive and forced him onto a United States-bound airplane at
gunpoint); and United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1531-32 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that the invasion of Panama to seize defendant, even if illegal, could
not implicate the Toscanino exception because no due process right specific to the
defendant was violated).
195.
896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant, tortured
by Honduran military authorities under the supervision of U.S. Marshals and
subsequently tortured by U.S. Marshals aboard a United States-bound airplane,
was not entitled to the dismissal of his indictment, although he might be entitled
to other legal remedies for American police misconduct).
196.
Lujan, 510 F.2d at 68.
197.
504 U.S. 655 (1992).
198.
Id. at 667.
199.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir.
1991).
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diplomatic protests to the United States government . . . [and]
stated unequivocally that the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain
by United States agents violated the 1980 Extradition Treaty...
[and] at all times demanded his immediate repatriation to
Mexico." 20 0 The Ninth Circuit followed the standard set in Lujan
and ordered Alvarez-Machain's return1 to Mexico pursuant to the
20
demand of the Mexican government.
In a landmark decision, however, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. 2 °2 In validating AlvarezMachain's abduction, the Court ruled that in construing a treaty,
20 3
its meaning must be determined solely by its specific terms.
The Court noted that the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico "says nothing about the obligations of the
United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of
people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences
under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs."2 ° 4 The majority
opinion further held that "[gleneral principles of international law
provide no basis for interpreting the Treaty to include an implied
term prohibiting international abductions." 20 5 The Court thus
concluded that Alvarez-Machain's claim that the 1980 treaty had
been violated was invalid and that the case must be remanded to
the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the circumstances of the
kidnapping were so shocking as to be a per se violation of
international law.2 0 6 The Ninth Circuit held that they were
not. 20 7 However, Alvarez-Machain was eventually released by

Judge Edward Rafeedie on the grounds that the prosecution's
2 03
case was built on "hunches" and 'the wildest speculation."
In sum, U.S. courts have decreed that abduction of suspects
from foreign countries is only unlawful if an extradition treaty
exists which specifically forbids kidnappings. While this policy
has short-term benefits for U.S. law enforcement, it also has the
potential to pose long-term difficulties for cooperation in criminal
matters between the United States and nations in which such
abductions have been conducted. For instance, following the
Alvarez-Machain abduction, Mexico threatened to cease all joint
counter-drug activities with U.S. law enforcement unless the

200.

Id,at 1467.

201.
202.
203.
204,
205.

See ic.
Alvarez-Machai, 504 U.S. at 670.
Id. at 669.
Id at 663.
Id. at 55.
See id at 670.
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir.

206.

207.
1992).
208. Jerry Seper, Justice Sued for $20 Million by Doctor in Camarena Case,
WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at A5, availablein 1993 WL 5836671.
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United States agreed to refrain from future abductions of Mexican
citizens. 20 9 This potential law enforcement disaster was averted
only when President George Bush personally promised the
government of Mexico to refrain from future violations of Mexican
sovereignty and to renegotiate the Mexico-United States
extradition treaty to forbid abductions. 2 10 Other nations, such as
Jamaica, have also characterized unilateral U.S. law enforcement
efforts as a violation of national sovereignty, and have threatened
to undermine vital areas of law enforcement cooperation in
combating illegal drugs at their source.2 11 Thus, too heavyhanded a policy of unilateral rendition has made, and will
continue to make, foreign nations less willing to cooperate when
212
voluntary assistance is requested.
C. The Dual CriminalityProblem

A third obstacle to extradition occurs when a fugitive is
accused of an offense that is not punishable as a crime in the
asylum state. The majority of extradition treaties require dual
criminality as a precondition for extradition; that is, the offense
for which extradition is sought must be an offense in both the
requesting state and the asylum state.213 Thus, if a fugitive flees
to a country where the offense with which he is charged is not a
crime, he may effectively immunize himself from prosecution.
One area in which the dual criminality problem has been an
especially frustrating impediment to the extradition process is
transnational money laundering. Many nations, especially those
of the former Communist bloc, have lagged behind the United
States in enacting statutes to combat individuals who conceal the
origin of illegally obtained funds. 2 14 For instance, the Russian
Federation did not reform its penal code to include a money
laundering statute until 1996, and similar reforms are still
pending in other former Soviet republics.2 1 5 Given the increasing
prevalence of criminals from the former Soviet Union in U.S.

209.
See Editorial, BorderBacklashv Mexico Reacts to U.S. Kidnap Approval
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 17, 1992, at B6, availablein 1992 WL 4244426.
210.
See id.; see also Diamond, supranote 168, at A9.
211.
See Mark Fineman, CaribbeanForning Own Alliances; Many Fault U.S.
Attitudes in the Region, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jul. 12, 1998, at 21A (noting
that many Caribbean nations, including Jamaica and Barbados, regard certain
American anti-drug policies as a violation of their sovereignty).
212.
See Editorial, supra note 209, at B6.
213.
See Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Mafia": Recent
Russian Legislation and Increased Bilateral CooperationMay Provide the Means, 37
VA. J. INTL L. 191, 208-09 (1996).
214. See id. at 205.
215.
See id.at 219.
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organized crime,2 1 6 this lack of parallel penal statutes makes it
possible for a significant fraction of money launderers operating

in the United States to escape prosecution simply by returning
home with their ill-gotten gains.
A similar discrepancy in penal legislation exists between the
United States and Israel. Although Israel has instituted certain
elementary anti-money laundering measures such as a voluntary
transaction reporting system, it is not an offense in Israel to
conceal the origin of the proceeds of crime.2 17
Despite the
introduction of comprehensive money laundering legislation in the
Israeli Knesset, the Israeli government has thus far failed to enact
these proposals into law. 2 18 Thus, Israeli money launderers, both
those who obtain their citizenship through birth and those who
are recent immigrants from Russia, are immune, not only from
extradition but from joint prosecution such as was offered in the
Sheinbein case if they return to Israel after committing crimes in
the United States.
A case in point is provided by the breakup of an IsraeliColombian money laundering ring in Connecticut in the early
1990s.2 19 In 1993, FBI agents in New Haven announced the
arrest of fourteen members of a criminal organization believed to
have laundered hundreds of millions of dollars for the Cali
cocaine cartel. 2 20 One of the ringleaders of this organization, an
Israeli national named Adi Tal-who had previously served time in
a federal prison on other money laundering charges-evaded
arrest and subsequently fled to Israel. 22 1 Although both Israeli
and U.S. authorities are aware of Tal's whereabouts, he can
neither be extradited to the United States, nor arrested in Israel
because the offense with which he is charged in the United States
is not a crime in his native land. 22 2 Thus, as long as Tal does not
leave Israel, he is free to enjoy the proceeds of his criminal
activity.
The increasingly international nature of money laundering
means that a nation which refuses to extradite or prosecute
money launderers may present an obstacle to the law
enforcement efforts of many nations. For instance, in the U.S.Israeli context, authorities recently broke up a money laundering

216.
217.

See id. at 194.
See Israel a Major Money-Laundering Centre for the Mafia, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE, June 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2140861.

218.

See David Harris, Police: Israel is a Global Money-Laundering Center,

JERUSALEM POST, June 26, 1997, at 8, availablein 1997 WL 7956391.
219.

See Edward Mahony, 13 Indicted in Drug Money Laundering Scheme,
26, 1993, at Al.

HARTFORD COURANT, May

220.

See id.
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222.
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ring whose members operated in Israel, the United States, and
France. 2 23
Russian immigrants to Israel, such as Michael
Mikhailov and Gregory Lerner, have also laundered millions of
dollars in Israel, Europe, and the United States, but remained
outside the reach of prosecutors for long periods by residing in
jurisdictions where money laundering is not an offense. 22 4 This
problem is not confined to Israel; in another recent case, a
Russian employee of Citibank laundered stolen funds through
accounts in seven countries, but could not be prosecuted because
money laundering was not recognized as an offense at that time
22s
in Russia.
The rise of Israeli money laundering has, to some extent, led
to a deterioration in U.S.-Israeli relations even prior to the
Sheinbein case. After enacting its own money laundering statute,
the United States has repeatedly brought political pressure to
2 26
bear upon other countries to criminalize money laundering.
Certain nations, such as Russia, Mexico and even Colombia, have

acceded to the U.S. request and added money laundering statutes
to their domestic criminal code. 2 27 Israel, however, has thus far
failed to do so. The result has been that Israel has become one of

the primary money laundering nations of the world and has
incurred the ire of law enforcement agencies in the United
2 28

States.
This has been felt keenly by the Israeli National Police
themselves, who are the primary sponsors of the anti-money

223.

See Israel a Major Money-Laundering Centerfor the Mafla, supra note

217.
224.
See Linda Slobodian, Just Who is John Doe?, CALGARY SUN, Dec. 20,
1998, at 38 (describing how lack of accountability in Israel aids Russian Mafia in
money laundering activities); see also Richard C. Paddock, A New Breed of
Gangsteris GlobalizingRussian Crime, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at Al.
t
225.
See Abramovsky, Prosecuting the 'Russian Mafia,
" supra note 213, at
197, 205.
226.
See, e.g., Michele Moser, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy
Laws Aimed at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 21 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L.,
321, 333 (1995) (noting American political pressure on foreign countries, including
Switzerland, to pass money laundering legislation).
227.
See Jimmy Gurul, The 1998 U.N. ConventionAgainst Illicit Trafficking in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten-Year Perspective: Is
InternationalCooperationMerely Illusory?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 74, 86 n.50 (1998)
(Colombia); id. at 86 n.49 (Brazil); Mathew Paulose Jr., United States v.
McDougald: The Anathema to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and NationalEfforts Against Money
Laundering, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 253, 269 (1997) (Mexico); Abramovsky,
Prosecutingthe 'RussianMafia," supra note 213, at 219 (Russia).
228.
See Israel a Major Money-Laundering Centre for the Mafia, supra note
217 (stating that Israel has become one of the world's premier money laundering
centers).
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laundering statute currently pending in the Israeli Knesset. 2 2 9 For
example, at a recent session of the Knesset, a spokesman for the
Israeli police estimated that approximately $4 billion in laundered
money-representing five to nine percent of the Israeli economypassed through Israel each year, and blamed the country's lack of
effective anti-laundering legislation as the primary reason for this
high volume. 230 In other cases in which Israelis have been
implicated in international money laundering operations, the
Israeli police have repeatedly expressed their exasperation at their
inability to prosecute these offenders. 2 3 1 In an effort to combat
money laundering as much as possible within the framework of
Israeli law, Israeli authorities have concluded agreements with
police agencies in countries such as Russia and Ulraine to
exchange money laundering information and to assist in foreign
investigations. 23 2 Due to the lack of effective domestic legislation,
however, the ability of Israeli law enforcement to fight money
laundering is drastically limited.
Thus, the complaints of State's Attorney Dean and Rep.
Livingston in the Sheinbein case received a warmer reception in
the United States than they might have otherwise. In an era
where crime has increasingly become an international activity,
law enforcement cooperation has come to require uniformity, not
only in extradition, but in many areas of substantive criminal law.
Since the promulgation of domestic law is a legislative, and
therefore a political function, international law enforcement has
increasingly become a political rather than a judicial process.
With the internationalization of crime, national governments must
either bring their criminal statutes into compliance with
international norms or take steps to ease the extradition of
international organized crime figures; otherwise, they risk
becoming international pariahs as havens for criminals.
D. American Reaction to ExtraditionObstacles in Perspective

The political ramifications of extradition can be seen not only
in the nature of the obstacles posed to extradition, but in the
manner in which the United States has responded to them. This
can be illustrated by comparing the measures which the United

229. See David Harris, supranote 218. See generally Julian Borger, Israel's
New Enemy Within, THr GUARDIAN, July 2, 1997, at 15, available in 1997 WL
2389537.
230. See Borger, supranote 229, at 15.
231.
See id.; see supranotes 217-22 and accompanying text.
232. See Ukrainian, IsraeliPolice Sign CooperationAccord, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, July 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSUB
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States has taken against nations that refuse to extradite fugitives
wanted by U.S. authorities.
The cases of Samuel Sheinbein and Humberto AlvarezMachain, for example, are similar in several crucial respects. Both
suspects were wanted in connection with offenses committed
against the United States, and both claimed citizenship in nations

that did not extradite their own nationals. The manner in which
U.S. authorities pursued these suspects, however, is far from
similar.
Alvarez-Machain was a citizen of Mexico, a Latin American
nation which has traditionally been regarded as part of the U.S.
sphere of influence. The prevalence of narcotics production in
this area, and the widespread activity of U.S. law enforcement
agencies therein, has also contributed to U.S. willingness to take
extraordinary measures to apprehend suspects in Mexico and
elsewhere in Latin America. Given this, and given the weak
military and economic position of Mexico in relation to the United
States, U.S. authorities felt that they had a free hand to resort to
unilateral abduction. 23 3 As stated above, this has been a common
pattern in U.S. law enforcement policy toward Latin American
countries; indeed, the 1990 invasion of Panama, which may
represent the most concerted U.S. effort to obtain extralegal
rendition of a suspect, 23 4 occurred in this part of the world.
Israel, as well, has been considered part of the U.S. sphere of
influence since its inception in 1948. Unlike Mexico, however,
Israel is a Western country, and has an influential political
constituency in the United States which would object to the use of
heavy-handed measures such as unilateral abduction. Thus, the
U.S. effort to obtain jurisdiction over Samuel Sheinbein has not
been as direct as the manner in which it pursued AlvarezMachain.
Nevertheless, the United States possesses a considerable
amount of leverage against the Israeli government due to the $3
billion in U.S. aid which is given annually to Israel. 23 5 Thus, if
sufficient domestic political sentiment exists, the United States
can bring financial pressure to bear on Israel to conform to U.S.
law enforcement expectations. This, in fact, was threatened on at
least one occasion by an U.S. legislator in connection with the
23 6
Sheinbein case.

233.
234.
235.
PosT, Nov.
236.

See supranotes 165-212 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
See Hillel Kuttler, Israel Gets First Reduced Aid Package, JERUSALEM
12, 1998, at 6, availablein 1998 WL 6537713.
See supranote 93 and accompanying text.
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Just as irregular rendition is a common denominator in U.S.
law enforcement relations with Latin American countries, the
exercise of political and economic pressure has played a central
role in the U.S. law enforcement efforts in the Middle East. An
instructive example of a U.S. joint prosecution in a foreign
country occurred in Jordan in 1994, where accused murderer
Mohammed Ismail Abequa fled with his children after strangling

his wife in their New Jersey home. 23 7 At the time, Jordan and the
United States had no extradition treaty; 2 3 8 thus, there was no
legal means of returning Abequa to the United States for
prosecution. The Jordanian Grand Prosecutor's office, however,
23 9
agreed to prosecute Abequa in Jordan on a charge of murder.
The crucial fact of the Abequa case is not that a joint
prosecution occurred, but the manner in which it was obtained.
The murder of Nina Abequa in July of 1994 took place in the
wake of the Middle East peace talks, a time when the Jordanian
government was intensively seeking to improve relations with the
United States.
On July 25, 1994, the Kingdom of Jordan
concluded a peace treaty with Israel after three years of
negotiation. 2 4° The following day, Jordan's King Hussein made a
speech before Congress in which he requested financial and
military assistance from the United States in order to build the
241
peace.
At the time, there was little political support for an increase
in the U.S. foreign aid budget due to an increased focus on
domestic spending within the U.S. government. Congress
approved $220 million in debt relief for Jordan on July 29, 1994,
and authorized the Pentagon to supply light weaponry to Jordan
after a marathon negotiating session. 2 42
However, Congress
stated that "there will need to be substantial steps in addition to
the courageous and laudable step that has just been taken" in
order to obtain support for additional assistance and debt
2
relief.L

237.

See 140 CONG. REc. S9046 (daily ed. July 14, 1994) (statement of Sen.

Lautenberg).
238. See Tareq Ayyaub, Police Say JordanianConfessed to His Wife's Murder,
Assoc. PRESS, July 24, 1994, availablein 1994 WI 10127278.
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See Admitted Wife Killer On 7ial in Jordan, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis),

Apr. 3, 1995, at 10A, availablein 1995 WL 3657490.
240. See Israel-Jordan, Treaty of Peace, 34 I.L.M. 43, 46 (entered into force
1995) (stating that treaty followed the principles of the Washington Declaration of
July 25, 1994, in which Israel and Jordan agreed to end their 46-year state of
war).

241.
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Earmarks, CONQ. Q. WKLY. RPe., 2155 (July 30, 1994), available in 1994 WL
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The U.S. government had already indicated that such
"substantial steps" included cooperation in the Abequa trial. The
Abequa case had received wide exposure in the U.S. media,
combining a sympathetic victim who had served four years in the
U.S. Army with concern for the fate of the children who had been
taken to Jordan.
On July 14, 1994, the U.S. Senate
acknowledged this public concern by explicitly urging the
2 44
personal involvement of King Hussein in locating the children.
In addition, the Senate urged the government of Jordan to use all
of its resources to apprehend Abequa and extradite him to the
United States. 24 5 While Abequa was not
extradited, he was
2 s
ultimately tried and convicted in Jordan. 4
As in the trial of Mizrahi and Reisch,2 4 7 U.S. prosecutors
brought witnesses to the Jordanian courtroom, including the
sister of the victim, a New Jersey detective, and the travel agent
who sold Abequa his ticket to Jordan. 248 After a trial in Amman,
Abequa was convicted on all charges and sentenced to fifteen
years' imprisonment, a sentence that would2 49
lead to his release
after twelve years according to Jordanian law.

Like Nina Abequa, Enrique Tello garnered widespread popular
sympathy due to the grisly manner of his death. In addition,
Tello was a member of an influential political constituency. Israel,
like Jordan, is subject to influence through its annual receipt of
U.S. aid. Thus, the same sort of leverage which was applied in the
Abequa case was used to convince Israeli authorities to be
cooperative in the matter of Sheinbein.
The Einhorn case, involving a fugitive located in France,
provides yet a third pattern of response. 25 0 France is neither
within a traditional U.S. sphere of influence nor financially
dependent upon the United States, and is, in addition, a Security
Council power in its own right. Even though Einhorn did not
have any claim whatsoever to French nationality, the United
States has not pursued his extradition with the same
aggressiveness it has shown toward Israel and Mexico when they
protect their own citizens. Although one commentator has termed

244.
245.

See id. at 46.
See iaL

246.

See Jordanian Who Killed U.S. Wife Gets 12 Years, CHI. TRIB., July 10,
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the Einhorn case "a trans-Atlantic legal storm,"25 1 Philadelphia

prosecutors have had to largely make due without federal
assistance in their effort to reverse the decision of the Bordeaux
court of appeal. Thus, U.S. response to obstacles in the
extradition process is arguably more dependent on domestic
political pressure and the relative strength of the requesting and
asylum states, than it is on the terms of treaties or international
conventions.
These three patterns of response, however, have a common

thread. They all illustrate the importance of compromise to
overcoming difficulties in extradition. The heavy-handed tactics
that the United States used in apprehending Alvarez-Machain in
Mexico accomplished the short-term goal of bringing him to trial,
but undermined more important long-term cooperation between
the two countries. 25 2 Likewise, Pennsylvania's willingness to
compromise with French standards of due process by
guaranteeing Einhorn a retrial may ultimately bear fruit where
prosecutorial outrage has not, as Einhorn was recently rearrested
in France and may soon be the subject of renewed extradition
proceedings.2 5 3 In the Sheinbein case as well, whatever the
ultimate outcome, justice could have been achieved much sooner
and with a minimum of difficulty if the United States had applied
the scalpel of compromise, rather than the bludgeon of threats.
Any solution to the United States's difficulties in the international
rendition of suspects will have to be addressed by a combination
of legal and political means, and will have to take the legitimate
concerns of other nations into account.

IV. EXTRADITION DIPLOMACY: METHODS OF RESOLVING POLITICAL
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
As demonstrated above, extradition proceedings, albeit
grounded in legal terms, are often resolved in accordance with
political considerations. The requesting state has a legitimate
interest in ensuring that crimes committed on its soil are
punished according to its law, and will arguably lose face
politically if it allows a fugitive criminal to go unpunished or to be
tried in a foreign country. The asylum state, although often
embarrassed by the presence of the fugitive and reluctant to grant
him sanctuary, will likewise risk losing face domestically if it
allows one of its citizens to be tried and imprisoned in the

251. FrenchRejectExtraditionofEx-U.S.Gun, supranote 144, at 12A.
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253.
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requesting state. 254 In reality, the interests of the two nations are
substantially the same: each desires that the fugitive be tried and
brought to justice. If a means can be found by which each nation
is able to protect its legitimate interests while avoiding domestic

political fallout, an agreement is likely.

Several methods may

exist by which both the requesting and asylum states can obtain
assurances that the majority of their primary concerns will be met

without making unreasonable demands of the other party.
A. An Organized Crime Exception
In certain cases, it has long been recognized that national
sovereignty must yield to the pursuit of criminals who commit
offenses against all mankind. As early as the eighteenth century,
any nation was entitled to apprehend and try pirates on the high
seas based on the theory that a pirate's crimes were considered
hosti humani generis, crimes that rendered them enemies of all
humanity.2 5S In modem times, this rationale has been extended
25 6
to crimes such as genocide and the waging of aggressive war.
In a further refinement, international law recognizes the right of
international tribunals to obtain jurisdiction over persons
suspected of these offenses regardless of the sovereignty of the
25 7
nations where they take refuge.
In recent decades, organized crime has taken on an
increasingly international character. It is now commonplace for
criminal organizations to include members in more than one
country and to routinely move contraband and money across
national borders. 25 8 In fact, it is rare for a narcotics smuggling
operation and its attendant money laundering activities to be
confined to one country.2 5 9 Moreover, the effects of organized
crime are felt on an international scale, in the form of increased
import-export costs and large-scale importation of narcotics to
26 0
consumer countries.
A convincing argument could be made that organized crime
should be recognized as an offense against humanity and that
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jurisdiction over organized crime suspects should be available
independently of the traditional extradition process. At least one

activity commonly conducted by criminal organizations-narcotics
trafficking-has been the subject of a 1988 United Nations
convention, the Vienna Convention, which is currently adhered to
by ninety-two countries. 2 6 1 Thus, it is arguable that narcotics
trafficking can-at a minimum-already be classified as an
offense against all nations.
While transnational
offenses committed by criminal
organizations should ideally be tried in an international criminal
forum, no such court currently exists. In addition, the sheer
volume of organized crime activity in the world would make an
international organized crime tribunal financially and logistically
impractical, if not impossible. However, organized crime figures
pose a serious enough threat to all countries that the nations
where they commit crimes should be able to obtain jurisdiction
over them swiftly and bring them to trial.
This could be accomplished either by a multilateral treaty or
domestic legislation which provides that organized crime suspects
are automatically extraditable notwithstanding the provisions of
any other law. Such legislation should also afford an expedited
process for returning organized crime figures to face trial. In this
way, organized crime figures will not be able to hide behind such
considerations as dual criminality and citizenship in the asylum
state in order to escape justice.
While a multilateral convention would be the most
comprehensive solution, such a convention would take a
considerable time to draft, ratify, and implement. In the
meantime, such an exception could be implemented in connection
with particular nations that present law enforcement difficulties,
such as Russia or Israel, by means of domestic legislation or
amendments to bilateral extradition treaties. In addition, such
nations could also be encouraged to ratify the Vienna Convention
and implement its extradition provisions with domestic
legislation.
Some safeguards will be necessary, however, in order to
prevent an organized crime exception from becoming a catchall
exception that eviscerates the protections afforded by the normal
extradition process. In order to fulfill the intent of this exception,
authorities in the requesting state would have to make a prima
facie showing that the requested suspect is an organized crime
figure as well as show probable cause to suspect him of the
offense with which he is charged. The statute or treaty will also

261. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493.
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have to define organized crime itself in order to clearly delineate
which criminals are subject to the exception. Guidance for this
definition may be taken from the laws of countries as diverse as
the United States and the Russian Federation which have enacted
legislation to punish members of criminal organizations. These
statutes include the Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations

26 3
Act (RICO)2 62 and Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE),

as well as Article 35 of the Russian Penal Code. 26 4 The definition
set forth in the CCE establishes an especially clear standard by
requiring that the suspect have conspired with five or more other
persons, that the organization at issue have been founded for the
purpose of committing crimes, and that the suspect have played a
supervisory role in the organization.2 6 5
Thus, an exception
similar to the CCE's definition of organized crime would enable
the extradition of major organized crime figures without the risk
that the exception would become all-encompassing-as might
happen if a broad definition such as that contained in RICO were
adopted. With such an exception to ensure that the criminals
which posed the greatest threat to the international community
could be extradited, international narcotics smugglers or money
launderers, such as Adi Tal, would be extraditable and would not
be able to frustrate the efforts of the United States and of asylum
countries such as Israel to bring them to justice.
B. Forfeiture of Nationalityfor ExtraditionPurposes
Countries that refuse to extradite their own nationals,
whether on constitutional or statutory grounds, often face a
considerable dilemma. While nations have a legitimate interest in
protecting their citizens from potential bias in foreign judicial
systems, a blanket policy of non-extradition of nationals may also
create a haven for criminals. This unintended side effect often
results in persons who have long since given up any real ties to
their native land seeking to reclaim their nationality for the sole
purpose of evading prosecution of their crimes in the locality
where those offenses were committed. These fugitives become an

enormous liability to their native countries, which are often
embarrassed by their presence but unable to use lawful means to
expel them.
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Blanket policies under which nations refuse to extradite their
own citizens are arguably outmoded. Many of the worst fears that
inspire these policies are unjustified, as the nations that are most
likely to deny fair justice to a foreign suspect are least likely to
have functioning extradition treaties with the nations where these
suspects hold citizenship. Israel, for instance, has no functioning
extradition treaties with countries such as Syria or Saudi Arabia,
nor does the United States have a bilateral extradition
relationship with Iran or Iraq. Thus, the possibility that
extradition of citizens will lead to injustice is mitigated by the
politics of the treaty-making process itself.
At least one nation, the Dominican Republic, has recognized
this in recent times with the passage of a 1998 law repealing a
three-decade-old statute which prohibited the extradition of
Dominican nationals. 26 6 The history of the extradition
relationship between the United States and the Dominican
Republic is strikingly similar to that between the United States
and Israel. Under a bilateral extradition treaty ratified in 1909,
the United States and the Dominican Republic undertook to
extradite fugitives regardless of nationality.2 6 7 In 1969, however,
the Dominican Congress responded to public sentiments, not
unlike those which inspired the Israeli Offenses Committed
Abroad Act, by enacting
a law that protected Dominican citizens
2 68
from being extradited.
This law was resented by U.S. law enforcement officials, who
were concerned that criminals within the growing Dominican-U.S.
community could escape justice simply by returning to the
country of their birth. 2 69 In fact, although the Dominican
Republic was willing to try Dominican fugitives for their U.S.
crimes if requested by the United States, more than four hundred
Dominican fugitives, mostly narcotics traffickers, escaped U.S.
prosecution between 1969 and 1998 by fleeing to their native
country. 2 70
As a result, numerous federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials in the United States, including New York
City Police Commissioner Howard Safir, traveled to the Dominican

Republic to lobby for a change in the Dominican extradition
statute.2 7 1 Although some Dominican legislators regarded this
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expression of U.S. concern as "Yankee imperialism," the
Dominican Republic's newly-elected U.S.-educated president,
Leonel Fernandez Reyna, shepherded legislation through the
Dominican Congress to repeal the 1969 statute and allow
2 72
extradition of Dominican nationals to the United States.
This legislation passed the Dominican Congress in July 1998
2 73
and was signed into law by President Fernandez on July 24th.
In analyzing the new statute, Dominican commentators opined
that their legislature "turned back decades of nationalism and
acknowledged that the drug threat has eclipsed old notions of
sovereignty."2 74 In addition, Dominican legislators were aware
that many of the victims of Dominican fugitives were themselves
Dominican immigrants to the United States, a situation that has
many parallels among the victims of Russian and Israeli criminals
as well as those of other emerging organized crime groups that
prey upon their own ethnic community. 275 Thus far, it appears
that the change in Dominican law has worked to the benefit of
U.S. law enforcement; despite initial fears that the law would not

be applied retroactively, 276 the Dominican Republic has begun
proceedings to extradite at least one fugitive wanted in the United
States for crimes committed during the period when extradition of
27 7
Dominican nationals was prohibited.
The Dominican legislation is an example not only of how
nations which confront transnational crime have backed away
from refusal to extradite their nationals, but also of how U.S. law
enforcement can effectively express its concerns without unduly
angering asylum states. By casting the Dominican-American law
enforcement problem as one of protecting Dominican crime
victims in the United States as well as safeguarding the
jurisdiction of U.S. law enforcement, the United States gave the
Dominican government a legitimate reason to change its law
without appearing to capitulate to U.S. pressure. A similar
argument could be utilized with Israel in emphasizing that many
victims of Israeli-U.S. criminals are themselves Jews and Israelis,
and it is therefore a proper concern of the Jewish state to ensure
that justice is done for these victims.
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For reasons of patriotism and national sovereignty, however,
many countries remain reluctant to extradite their citizens to face
trial in foreign courts. These countries will continue to face the
possibility of becoming havens for persons who commit crimes
abroad and of damaging relations with friendly countries which
inure to the greater good of their populace.
One method of
avoiding this dilemma, while continuing to protect the rights of
bona fide nationals, is to enact legislation which provides that
persons who are absent from their native country for a certain
period of time forfeit their nationality for extradition purposes
only. One such policy was recently suggested by Amnon
Rubinstein, a member of the Israeli Knesset.2 78 Under Professor
Rubinstein's proposed legislation, an Israeli citizen who had been
absent from Israel for more than one year would be eligible for
extradition. 2 79 While this proposal may set too strict a limit on
absence from Israel-students or persons who work for

multinational corporations,

for instance, might be stationed

abroad for several years at a time-it would remove the protection
of Israeli law from those who effectively abandon Israeli
nationality until it is needed again as a means of escaping
prosecution.
A similar method of determining eligibility for extradition
might be to hold that any person who applies for citizenship or
permanent residency in a foreign country has forfeited his
nationality for extradition purposes. This would have the
advantage of limiting the availability of extradition to those who
have taken affirmative measures to divest themselves of their ties
to their native land rather than setting an arbitrary time limit
that may include people who are absent for legitimate reasons.
This would be particularly applicable when the nation in which
the accused has taken out citizenship or residency is the nation
where his crimes were committed.
Yet a third approach to forfeiture of nationality would be a
multi-factor test such as that proposed by Judge Ravid. This test
considers such factors as place of birth, place of domicile, length
of residence or absence, dual citizenship, and use of a foreign
passport. 28 0 Under any of these policies, nations will remain able
to protect the rights of their bona fide citizens while enabling
themselves to expel unwanted and politically embarrassing
citizens of convenience.
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C. Transferof Penal Sanctions

Among the concerns that prevented an accord in the
Sheinbein case were Israeli procedural law and U.S. prison
conditions. For instance, the Maryland prosecutor assigned to
the Tello case worried that Sheinbein might face a shorter
sentence if tried and convicted in Israel, and that Tello's family
might not have a chance to speak prior to sentencing in Israel as
they would in Maryland. 2 8 l Conversely, Sheinbein was concerned
that as a Jew of Israeli ancestry, he would suffer discriminatory
conditions in U.S. prisons and might not be able to receive a fair
28 2
trial in a U.S. court.
An international device exists that could potentially address
these concerns. Any two countries that are parties to a transfer
of penal sanctions treaty, such as the United States and Israel,
may agree that a defendant be incarcerated in the asylum state if
convicted in the requesting state. 28 3 Under this arrangement, the
asylum state would compromise by waiving any right to reevaluate the length of the sentence or the terms of imprisonment.
However, nations that regard sentences of death or life without
parole as violations of human rights 28 4 could continue to insist,
as many do now, that extradition be conditioned upon such an
2 5
extreme sentence not being imposed.
Under this system, the suspect would be returned to face
trial in the requesting state, but would be guaranteed that he
would be incarcerated in his own country if convicted. Likewise,
the requesting state would be assured that the sentence imposed
by its court would not be disturbed. Although such an accord
might not be possible in certain countries which refuse
extradition in cases where a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole might be imposed, it might well have been
sufficient in Sheinbein's case. Although Israel does not itself

impose sentences of life without parole, it has in the past
extradited fugitives who faced such sentences to the United
States. 28 6 It thus appears that the Israeli government does not
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regard a sentence of life without parole as a fundamental violation
of human rights, and might therefore be willing to administer
such a sentence if imposed by a Maryland court. In addition, the
U.S. Congress has declared itself in favor of the fuller use of
transfer of penal sanctions treaties and might thus be amenable
to a solution under which the integrity of U.S. sentences is
preserved.

V. CONCLUSION

As the case of Samuel Sheinbein demonstrates, international
extradition has as much to do with domestic politics and the
willingness of authorities to compromise as it does with the actual
terms of any treaty. Although Israel and the United States have a
long history of cooperation in law enforcement and joint
prosecutions, the demands of prosecutors in Maryland and the
inflexibility of Israeli extradition legislation have thus far stymied
Israel's best efforts to cooperate with U.S. authorities in this case.
The narrow decision of the Israeli Supreme Court demonstrates
its commitment to enforcing Israeli legislation regardless of
political considerations, raising the strong possibility that a
similar combination of circumstances will undermine U.S.-Israeli
relations in future cases where fugitives with Israeli citizenship
flee to Israel after committing crimes in the United States.
Regardless of the outcome of the Sheinbein case, reform in
the Israeli-U.S. extradition process is necessary. Several
compromises are available to Israel that would satisfy U.S.
interests without sacrificing its legitimate policy of protecting its
citizens from unjust trials abroad. One such alternative would be
to enact an exception under which organized crime figures who
present the most clear and present danger to the international
community would be extraditable notwithstanding other
legislation. Another alternative would be to pass legislation

providing that persons who are absent from Israel for a significant
time or who take up permanent residency in another country,
may be extradited if they flee to Israel after committing an offense.
Yet a third alternative would provide that Israeli citizens may be
extradited, but only if they are returned to Israel upon conviction
to serve their sentences. None of these is a perfect solution for
the United States or for Israel, but all three allow both 2 countries
87
to protect the interests which are their primary concern.
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